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A Response to Professor Johnsen
Mark 1. Rozellt
I generally do not believe that it is either necessary or
fruitful to respond to responses. I will nonetheless break
precedent here to briefly object to Dawn Jobnsen's essay. In
trying to pick apart my research she repeatedly both misrepre-
sents the facts and my positions. Apparently only she sees the
truth whereas others are guilty of mischaracterizations. In the
end, she squanders a nice opportunity to contribute something
valuable to the debate over executive privilege. Sa Prakash
shows the way and though I disagree with his interpretation,
clearly Professor Johnsen can learn much from him about good
scholarship and argumentative tone.
In light of Professor Johnsen's previous position in the Of-
fice of Legal Counsel for the Clinton administration she might
feel a bit defensive about the President's actions on executive
privilege. It was her job to represent the President's interests
in these matters and that surely must have been a tall order.
But she destroys her credibility as an academic discussant by
presenting a heavy-handed and overly defensive justification
for presidential actions with which no credible scholar to my
knowledge would agree.
Perhaps she makes a good point here and there in the es-
say, as many of these more recent events are open to interpre-
tation and all of us are struggling to work with an incomplete
record of information on issues of executive privilege. I might,
for example, concede that the President's stand on the Freeh
memorandum had some merit and I certainly agree that the
Burton committee did not always engage in good faith negotia-
tions during that controversy. But in her zeal to attack my
presentation of the events she misses the key points that I
make: (1) that it weakens executive privilege for a president to
assert that power as some kind of opening bid in a negotiating
process and then to back down; and (2) that the congressional
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power of investigation must override executive privilege unless
the president's claim meets the proper standards for asserting
that power.
Neither time nor space allows a full response to Professor
Johnsen's many misrepresentations of my article. I would
nonetheless like to point out some egregious examples. She
claims that I am "harshly critical" of presidents and that I
don't convey a "pattern" of criticism. Yet elsewhere she dis-
cerns a pattern and then objects to the pattern that I developed
(of modern presidents inventing other bases for executive
privilege to hide embarrassments and then frequently capitu-
lating, doing further damage to this power). She wrongly con-
veys the impression that I am dogmatically opposed to presi-
dents using executive privilege and that I am somehow
concerned with adding up wins and losses in presidential-
congressional battles over access to information.1 She com-
pletely misstates my view in suggesting that I do not properly
respect the needs of candid advice within the White House.
She claims that I misstate the applicable test of whether Con-
gress's request for information overrides a claim of executive
privilege when in fact I am merely presenting my own norma-
tive assessments and not describing the controlling case law.
Just because I disagree with a judicial interpretation on the
proper use of executive privilege that does not mean, as Profes-
sor Johnsen claims, that I misstate some facts or ignore some
piece of evidence. 2
Elsewhere Professor Johnsen discusses the issue of politi-
cal accommodation as though I am completely oblivious to its
role in resolving inter-branch disputes. Then she says that I
criticize the executive branch "when it reaches an accommoda-
tion with Congress." Not only a contradiction, that statement
is just flat-out wrong. I criticize presidents who say that they
1. This criticism is truly ironic. I wrote my book on executive privilege
directly as a challenge to Raoul Berger's dogmatically anti-executive privilege
tone. I recognize the legitimacy of executive privilege, when properly invoked.
If there is any sense that the current article conveys an anti-presidential tone,
it is only because of the particular actions of presidents in the post-Watergate
period-the focus of this work.
2. Furthermore, just because the President's Attorney General sides
with the President in a dispute with Congress doesn't mean that the Presi-
dent was right and Congress wrong. In the particular controversy to which
Professor Johnsen refers, Attorney General Reno indeed cited the controlling
case law but in so doing rendered an incorrect interpretation as I explain in
the essay.
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are taking a principled stand and then back down because it is
politically expedient to do so in the short-term. Either be seri-
ous about using executive privilege or don't use it at all. That
power should be rarely used and only for the most compelling
reasons and is not to be exercised as something in a lawyer's
arsenal of tactics to bid with against adversaries.
Professor Johnsen says in a footnote that I am wrong to
suggest that the practice of keeping OLC legal opinions secret
originated with the Bush presidency. I never said that. She
implies that I am in error to say that the Bush administration
created a secret opinions policy to deny Congress access to a
Justice Department memorandum. But that is exactly what
happened in one case.3
Professor Johnsen blasts me for speculating about presi-
dential motives in asserting executive privilege, although she
discusses motives herself. She tries to score some rhetorical
points by comparing my criticisms of President Clinton's ac-
tions to those of the Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. I can
understand how in the current overheated political environ-
ment this comparison is supposed to be the kiss of death, but
let's not forget that we're contributing works of scholarship
here and not scoring political points. Besides, Starr prevailed
on most of the various privilege issues before the courts, so
perhaps I should wear the comparison as a badge of honor. Yet
Professor Johnsen suggests that the White House, not the OIC,
prevailed in the court on the issue of executive privilege. That
Judge Norma Halloway Johnson reaffirmed the legitimacy of
executive privilege was not exactly some kind of stirring vic-
tory for the White House. Does anyone other than Professor
Johnsen actually believe that the President undertook these
battles merely for the purpose of protecting the constitutional-
ity of executive privilege rather than as a delaying tactic?
Cannot she acknowledge that the Clinton White House made
at least some mistakes in refusing to release documents or in
the efforts to prevent certain individuals from testifying before
3. See Department of Justice Authorization for Appropriations, Fiscal
Year 1992, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, 102d Cong., at 76-85 (1991) (statement of Steven R. Ross, General
Counsel to the Clerk of the House of Representatives). IfI follow her point in
footnote 5, Professor Johnsen is suggesting that I argue that the secret opin-
ions policy set the precedent for the denying to Congress of secret OLC legal
opinions. That is an erroneous reading of my essay and I cannot understand
how she came to that conclusion.
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the grand jury? By defending Clinton's every action Professor
Johnsen surely raises doubts about her own objectivity.
In criticizing my approach to executive privilege Professor
Johnsen writes: "The reality of congressional oversight of the
executive branch is not a neat theoretical world but one that
requires the messy give and take of negotiations." We can all
agree to that. I devoted the better part of a book arguing the
very point that the messy give and take of the separation of
powers system is the only mechanism for resolving executive
privilege disputes.4 That is why I don't believe that Congress
should adopt statutory guidelines on executive privilege. But
again Professor Johnsen contradicts herself. She also claims
that there is a need to devote much attention to defining the
proper scope and limits of executive privilege and to base deci-
sions in this area on principles.5 Ultimately it is unclear in her
essay whether disputes over executive privilege are in the neat
theoretical world in which principles are the guide or in the
land of give and take. She asserts some of her own guidelines
but they are so vague it is unclear how they might help to re-
solve executive privilege disputes. How do the guidelines of
greater "flexibility," "balance," and "compromise" get us any
closer to understanding how to resolve these disputes?
Professor Johnsen's overriding argument is that my ap-
proach to executive privilege is "fundamentally misguided."
Ultimately she undercuts her own argument. She says that
she agrees with me on the basic legitimacy of executive privi-
lege; that it is proper to focus such research on legislative-
executive disputes rather than judicial-executive ones; that in
a democratic system the presumption must be in favor of open-
ness but that presidents have secrecy needs; that Nixon cre-
ated an imbalance against executive privilege; and that Con-
gress should not pass statutory guidelines on executive
privilege. How can she agree with almost all of my major ar-
guments and then say that my approach is "fundamentally
misguided?"6
4. MARK J. ROZELL, ExEcuTivE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY
AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (1994).
5. Professor Johnsen is disturbed that I do not spend what she considers
enough space in this essay to fully explain the proper scope and limits of ex-
ecutive privilege. I have written another essay on that topic alone, Executive
Privilege: Definition and Standards of Application, PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES
QUARTERLY (forthcoming December 1999).
6. Although Professor Johnsen says that she agrees with me on the issue
of openness, I see absolutely nothing in her article to lend credibility to that
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statement. She is in favor of resisting legislative and independent counsel
claims for information, giving ground over time only through what she calls a
process of "accommodation." The process of accommodation that she favors is
entirely one-sided.
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